Introduction
Between 1992 and 1999, the United States enjoyed sustained, rapid economic expansion characterized by rising labor force participation, booming net investment spending for information equipment and computer software, and strong productivity growth. Substantial foreign capital inflows helped to finance the investment boom as well as a rise in private domestic consumption spending. Global financial crises in Asia, Russia, and Brazil, and the subsequent slowdown in foreign economic growth added momentum to these foreign capital inflows; today, foreigners hold net claims on the United States equal to nearly 12 percent of our GDP.
Policymakers are increasingly more concerned about the sustainability of capital inflows to the United States. Some fear that the growing possibility of an abrupt turnaround in capital flows poses a serious threat to our continued economic prosperity. They contend that slower U.S. economic growth, in conjunction with stronger economic activity abroad, would afford international investors a strong incentive and an attractive opportunity to diversify out of their dollar-denominated assets. If this happens, the dollar will depreciate and U.S. interest rates will rise, with possibly wrenching effects on the way Americans save, consume, and invest.
This Policy Discussion Paper illustrates how capital inflows can be both a boon and a bane to economic growth. Using basic accounting identities and a simple model of exchange rate and interest rate determination, I will show how capital inflows have aided the current U.S. economic expansion by financing the acquisition of new capital and by supporting private consumption. I will then discuss one limitation of those capital inflows and suggest how their slowdown or reversal could affect our economic prospects. Trade in capital-like trade in goods and services-benefits all parties, but the economic interdependence increases our vulnerability to world events.
Financial Inf lows and Current Account Deficits
Most Americans take comfort, if not some national pride, in the knowledge that more investment funds have flowed into the United States since 1982 than have flowed out. Many, however, are disconcerted that over the same period, the United States has consistently imported more goods and services than it has exported. Many Americans do not understand that these two events are inseparable aspects of the same economic process. The connection between them stems from an underlying relationship between consumption, saving, and investment. This section will explain the connections among the current account, the financial account, savings, and investment, illustrating the relationships using U.S. data.
Any country that runs a current account deficit will experience a financial inflow. 1 The current account records trade in goods and services, income earned from domestically owned assets abroad, income payments on foreign-owned assets in the home country, and net unilateral transfers. The financial account measures transactions in stocks, bonds, bank accounts, and other types of financial securities. Transactions in the current account represent immediate claims on real economic resources, whereas items in the financial account represent claims on future output. A persistent current account deficit indicates that a country has not exported enough goods and services to pay for its imports, unilateral transfers, and net income payments 1. In June 1999, the Commerce Department began categorizing U.S. international transactions into three groups: the current account, the capital account, and the financial account. The capital account consists of capital transfers and the acquisition or disposal of certain nonfinancial assets that were formally counted as unilateral transfers in the current account. Since they typically amount to less than 1 percent of the current account deficit, this paper largely ignores the capital account. to foreigners. To settle its balance, the deficit nation must give foreigners financial claims against its future output, or it must reduce its existing claims to their future output. This process creates financial inflows that, in the absence of measurement error, exactly equal the current account deficit. (Similarly, financial outflows must accompany and exactly match any current account surplus.) This relationship is expressed as
(1) CA = NF + SD 1 .
In this equation, CA denotes the current account surplus (CA > 0) or deficit (CA < 0).
NF represents net financial flows, defined such that NF > 0 refers to net acquisition of foreign assets (financial outflow) and NF < 0 refers to a foreign net acquisition of domestic assets (financial inflow). 2 SD 1 results from the inevitable statistical discrepancies that arise in collecting the data corresponding to equation (1). Economists refer to this equation as the balance-of-payments identity.
The U.S. current account deficit has increased almost continuously since the beginning of the current business expansion in 1992, and it has advanced sharply since 1996 (figure 1). In 1999, the U.S. current account deficit equaled an unprecedented $331.5 billion, or 3.6 percent of GDP.
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2. I have reversed the sign on the financial inflows and outflows from that found in the official balance of payments because doing so simplifies the graphical exposition that follows. Table 1 maintains the standard balanceof-payments practice of counting financial outflows (inflows) as negative (positive) items.
3. Because they represent transactions that do not involve a quid pro quo, unilateral transfers are essentially gifts. Net income receipts include payments on cross-border asset holding and a small amount of labor income. 
Savings, Investment, and Capital Flows
A country that runs a current account deficit, such as the United States, is spending more for consumption, investment, and government purchases than it is currently producing, and it is financing the excess expenditure through net capital inflows. Beginning from this relationship, a straightforward adjustment to the national income accounts demonstrates that a country experiencing a current account deficit (CA < 0) and a capital inflow (NF < 0) is saving (Sp + Sg) less than is necessary to finance its gross private domestic investments (I ):
In equation (2), Sp refers to gross private domestic savings and Sg is gross public savings (the total federal, state, and local government budget surplus); SD 2 includes statistical discrepancies associated with measuring savings and investment.
Since 1992, the ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP has increased nearly 2.7 percentage points, while the ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP has risen 3.5 percentage points (see table 2 ). The increase in the former is solely the result of a rise in total government savings amounting to 6.4 percentage points of GDP. The ratio of gross private savings to GDP declined 3.7 percentage points. As these data indicate, the inflow of foreign capital (NF < 0) that has accompanied the U.S. current account deficit since 1992 has permitted more investment and more private consumption than would otherwise have been possible. 4
Data available through 1998 indicate that the entire 3.3 percentage point increase in the investment-to-GDP ratio in 1992-98 went toward the acquisition of new capital goods rather than higher costs of maintaining the existing capital stock. 5 Moreover, half the increase in investment during that period appears as the acquisition of equipment and software.
Advocates of the "new economy" typically recognize investment in computers and other A technology-induced rise in the productivity of capital increases the demand for loanable funds. This appears as a shift in to the right. As the demand for loanable funds increases, real interest rates and the quantity of savings rise. 
Dollar Appreciation and the Current Account
The preceding analysis showed how the current account, the financial account, savings, and investment are related using ex post equilibrium conditions. This section will show how changes in real interest rates and real exchange rates maintain that equilibrium. The model seems to confirm that U.S. productivity advances and exogenous foreign financial inflows have shaped recent U.S. economic developments. The model produces different patterns among interest rates, exchange rates, loanable funds, net foreign financial flows, and the current account balance, depending on the exogenous event that initiates the adjustment. To conform to recent U.S. economic developments, I have assumed an exogenous gain in productivity. As the productivity of capital improves, the demand for loanable funds increases; this is represented in panel A by a shift to the right in line I. If all else remains constant, real interest rates in the United States will rise and attract a greater inflow of foreign financing (NF < 0 in figure 1) . Panel B suggests that higher domestic interest rates will encourage both foreign financial inflows and domestic savings, and the total quantity of loanable funds will increase. Before foreigners can invest in the United States, they must acquire dollars, and their increased demand will cause the dollar to appreciate.
Consistent with this effect, panel C shows that when financial inflows rise (NF shifts to the left), the dollar appreciates in real terms. This appreciation, which raises the foreign-currency price of U.S. exports and lowers the dollar price of U.S. imports, fosters a larger U.S. current account deficit. In this simple model, changes in both real interest rates and real dollar exchange rates maintain both the savings-investment identity (equation [2] ) and the balance- Is the Current Account Deficit Sustainable?
While persistent financial inflows have helped to support investment and consumption in the United States, they have given foreigners substantial claims on our future output in the form of stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments. Since the late 1980s, the stock of foreign claims against this nation has exceeded the stock of U.S. claims on other countries;
by 1999, our negative net international investment position equaled 11.7 percent of GDP (see figure 4 ).
Our net international investment position cannot continue to decline as a share of GDP without limit. At some point, international investors will become reluctant to hold our debt without adequate compensation for the perceived risk of doing so. Then, real interest rates will rise and the exchange value of the dollar will fall, forcing a change in the saving and investment patterns that have produced our persistent current account deficits and financial inflows (see Obstfeld and Rogoff [2000] and Mann [1999] 
Net International Investment Position
Many factors contribute to deterioration in a country's net international investment position. This section, which builds on Howard (1989) where SD 1t captures any statistical discrepancy in the balance-of-payments accounts and t is a time variable.
Since 1989, the value of foreign-owned assets in this country has exceeded the value of U.S.-owned assets abroad, implying a negative net international investment position (figure 4).
In 1999, the difference equaled nearly $1.1 trillion, or 11.7 percent of GDP. Because of this negative position, analysts frequently refer to the United States as a net debtor country, although not all foreign-owned assets in the United States are debt instruments. Almost 30 percent represent foreign direct investments in this country (figure 5)-that is, equity shares in U.S.
enterprises that confer decision-making authority on foreigners. The proportion has increased from 18 percent in 1985. In addition, 11 percent of our liabilities are the official dollar reserves of foreign governments. While these generally consist of debt-style instruments, they may be less responsive than private portfolios to changes in expected returns.
All investors-private and government-require a return on their investment, and this return may be sensitive to perceived risks that a country faces in meeting its obligations.
A key factor in determining these risks is the country's burden of servicing outstanding net foreign claims. Economists often assess the debt-service burden of a country's negative net international investment position by comparing it to GDP, because outstanding financial instruments ultimately represent claims on a country's output. Consequently, equation (4) becomes (5) ,
where Y refers to nominal GDP. Hence, the ratio of net foreign claims to a country's ability to service those claims (equation Equation (5) suggests that a country could maintain a current account deficit indefinitely, so long as it does not rise faster than GDP. With some rearranging, equation (5) 
The net international investment ratio changes, one for one, with changes in the ratios of the trade balance (TB t ), net unilateral transfers (U t ), and the statistical discrepancy (SD 1t ) to GDP. The two subsequent sets of bracketed terms relate the net international investment ratio to a comparison of income earnings and valuation gains on U.S.-owned foreign assets with those on foreign-owned U.S. assets. In equation (6), r A,t is the income earned in year t from U.S.-owned foreign assets, expressed as a percentage of the previous year's stock of assets.
Similarly, v A,t is the valuation adjustment expressed as a percentage of the stock of the previous year's assets. The asterisks designate corresponding terms for foreign-owned assets in the United States. GDP growth, which ultimately affects the denominator of the net international investment ratio, is given by g t . Table 3 , which illustrates the components of equation (6), shows the factors contributing to the changes in the net international investment ratio. Since 1981, persistent U.S. trade deficits more than accounted for the 22.5 percentage point decline in the net international investment ratio. (Unilateral transfers to foreigners remained fairly constant at 0.5 percent of GDP.)
-+ Substantial net gains (income and valuation adjustments) from the existing stock of foreign investments, however, mitigated the overall effect of trade deficits on the change in the net international investment ratio.
This positive influence seems to be waning. Since 1995, income payments on foreign-owned assets in the United States have risen much faster than income received from U.S.-owned assets abroad, and the balance (net investment income) turned negative in 1998 (see figure 2) . Table   4 illustrates two factors that have contributed to this development: First, the spread by which the value (at current costs) of foreign-owned assets in the United States exceeds the value of U.S.-owned assets abroad continues to widen (compare columns 4 and 7). Second, while the rate of return (income earnings) on U.S.-owned assets abroad has continued to exceed that on foreignowned assets in the United States, the average spread has narrowed somewhat. In contrast to net income payments, valuation adjustments have tended to exert a net positive influence on our net investment position, though they are volatile and do not always work in our favor.
As foreign financial inflows continue into the United States and our international investment position deteriorates, the rate of return on foreign-owned assets in the United States will rise further if investors become uncertain about the future exchange value of the dollar or about U.S. policies that may affect asset returns. This could have important implications for the U.S. economy. 
Risk Premium and Foreign Growth
Concern about the growing risks of investing in the United States would result in higher real U.S. interest rates and a dollar depreciation. Figure 6 A decline in financial inflows also reduces the total supply of loanable funds, represented by a shift to the left in . U.S. interest rates will rise, and the quantity of investment will fall. 9. For estimates of various trade elasticities, see Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez (1998) .
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Using a simple partialequilibrium model, Mann (1999, chapter 10) provides some empirical estimates of the sustainability of the U.S. current account.
12 flows to the United States slow, NF in panel C shifts to the right, and the dollar must depreciate to maintain the balance-of-payments identity. As a result of these adjustments, interestsensitive spending and investment in the United States would decline, domestic savings would rise, and the trade deficit would narrow.
Economists typically think of the risk premium as a function of the outstanding stock of net foreign claims on a country relative to its GDP-that is, its ability to service those claims.
This suggests that economic adjustments would continue until the net international investment ratio ceased to decline or returned to a ratio that restored investor confidence. 8
Magnitude of the Adjustment
While it is fairly easy to predict the direction of economic adjustments in the face of investor uncertainty, it is more difficult to forecast the extent of the adjustment. One method follows the approach of Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996) . By setting equation (5) equal to zero and rearranging the terms, we can see how large the trade surplus must be to prevent a further decline in the net international investment ratio:
. This approach assumes the other variables are either predetermined (the lagged investment terms) or of little consequence to the adjustment process (unilateral transfers and the statistical discrepancy).
The ex post critical value for the U.S. trade balance changes substantially from year to year because of the high variation in some of the components of equation (7). Based on average values in 1997, 1998, and 1999, the United States could prevent a further decline in the net international investment ratio by maintaining a trade deficit of roughly 0.5 percent of GDP ($52 billion). A small deficit is sustainable because of the net gains we receive on our foreign investments; however, these gains recently have been attributable solely to positive valuation adjustments, which are highly volatile and not consistently favorable. If we assume that valuation adjustments have no net influence, the United States would need to immediately maintain a trade surplus of nearly 0.2 percent of GDP ($17 billion) to prevent further decline in its net investment ratio. Given that further deterioration in the income component of the current account is likely, the critical value of the trade surplus will undoubtedly grow.
Because the response of imports and exports to price changes is somewhat inelastic, a substantial exchange rate change might accompany any swing to a U.S. trade deficit (see Obstfeld and Rogoff [2000] ). 9
When?
It is virtually impossible to say how high the U.S. net international investment ratio could rise before international investors become reluctant to hold financial claims against the United
States without a significant risk premium. Canada, for example, has maintained current account deficits-often exceeding 3 percent of GDP-almost continuously since 1969. 10 As a result, Canada's net international investment position approached 35 percent of GDP in the early
tions in the Canadian dollar's real effective value, no sustained depreciation accompanied these deficits. Moreover, although the spread between real interest rates in Canada and in the United States sometimes widened when the current account deficit increased relative to GDP, the correlation is weak at best.
Similarly, Australia has experienced a long string of current account deficits averaging 3 percent of GDP. Australia's negative net international investment position is approximately 45 percent of GDP-more than triple that of the United States. In contrast to Canada, Australia has experienced a sustained depreciation of its real effective exchange rate, but the spread between real Australian and U.S. interest rates seems uncorrelated with the size of the current account deficit. In neither Canada's nor Australia's recent experience have the persistent current account deficits and growing negative net international investment position obviously disrupted their economies. 11 These comparisons do not support fears that a rapid and severe adjustment is imminent.
Interdependence and Vulnerability
When financial flows cross borders, countries need not finance gross domestic investment solely from gross domestic savings. International access to funds enables countries to finance a greater amount of investment at a lower cost than would be possible in autarky; it also fosters portfolio diversification and provides greater opportunity for consumption smoothing.
Consequently, as financing becomes more mobile across countries, current account surpluses and deficits should become larger and, perhaps, more volatile. Domestic savings and domestic investment should become less closely correlated. 12 Such a pattern is increasingly evident in the United States. While overall levels of gross domestic savings and gross domestic investment (private plus government) remain highly correlated, the relationship between annual changes in these series has become substantially weaker. Between 1959 and 1980 , the correlation coefficient between changes in gross domestic savings and changes in gross domestic investment was 0.965, whereas this statistic dropped to 0.735 between 1980 and 1999. The data indicate that changes in domestic consumption and saving patterns have less effect on changes in investment patterns (and vice versa) than in the past because of the availability of foreign financing. Consumption and investment can proceed more smoothly because of financial mobility. 13 This growing international interdependence, however, increases the U.S. economy's vulnerability to financial outflows. Net financial flows to the United States respond to international growth rate differentials. If concerns about risk create a desire among international investors to diversify, relatively faster foreign economic growth-which many now anticipate-might provide an opportunity to do so. Unfortunately, we have no objective basis for determining when that might occur, how quickly it might happen, or how much it might affect interest rates and exchange rate. It does not, at present, seem inevitable.
11.
Using a wider sample of countries, Mann (1999, p. 156) contends that current account deficits reached approximately 4.2 percent of GDP.
12. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, pp. 27-28) provide some evidence that the cross-country correlation between savings and investments for 1982-91 is weaker than the correlation for 1960-74 reported by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) .
13.
The need to eventually service foreign financial inflows implies that savings and investment (as ratios to GDP) cannot permanently diverge. Using data spanning 38 years through 1998, Olivei (2000) finds that U.S. investment, rather than U.S. savings, eventually adjusted to current account imbalances. 
